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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Using the Steel Vessel Material-cost Index to Mitigate 
Shipbuilder Risk 
Presenter: Edward G. Keating is a senior economist at RAND specializing in applied and empirical 
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and DoD working capital fund policies.  He received a PhD in Economic Analysis and Policy from 
Stanford University. 
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This paper describes how the US Navy structures fixed-price and fixed-price, incentive-
fee shipbuilding contracts and how labor- and material-cost indexes can mitigate shipbuilder risk 
in either type of contract.  The Navy frequently uses the Steel Vessel material-cost index, a 
Bureau of Labor Statistics-derived cost index based on the mix of materials in a typical 
commercial cargo ship constructed in the 1950s.  The Steel Vessel Index has excessive 
weighting on iron and steel, thereby providing shipbuilders with a mismatch between their actual 
and the Index-assumed material-cost structure.  We recommend the Navy use a material-cost 
index with more up-to-date weightings. 
Introduction 
The Navy wants to provide its shipbuilders with appropriate incentives to produce 
militarily effective vessels at minimum cost to the Navy. 
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Fixed-price contracts provide incentive to a shipbuilder to produce at minimum cost.  
After contract award, cost savings the shipbuilder can implement flow directly to the shipbuilder, 
resulting in higher profit.  Conversely, cost overruns are borne by the shipbuilder, resulting in 
lower-than-anticipated profits.   
Fixed-price contracting becomes problematic, however, when a shipbuilder is forced to 
bear risk outside of its control.  For instance, ship construction requires material inputs like steel, 
wire, cable, and myriad others.  If the global prices of these commodities rise, a fixed-price 
shipbuilder will have lower profits (or increased losses) external to the shipbuilder’s efforts. 
Ultimately, the Navy can induce a shipbuilder to agree to any arrangement, including 
having the shipbuilder bear material-cost risk, by offering the shipbuilder a high enough price.  
But it is likely to be preferable, at least ex ante, for the Navy to dissipate risk external to its 
shipbuilder in order to pay less for the systems the Navy needs. 
Conversely, the Navy should not fully immunize a shipbuilder against risks within the 
shipbuilder’s control, e.g., if the shipbuilder’s own failures cause a cost overrun.  In such a case, 
the shipbuilder should incur at least a portion of the loss.  Of course, it can sometimes be 
difficult to distinguish problems within a shipbuilder’s control versus those caused or 
exacerbated by Navy decisions (e.g., changing requirements) versus those related to external 
issues (e.g., the rising global price of steel).  The Navy uses labor- and material-cost indexes to 
attempt to correct for several significant cost risks outside its shipbuilders’ control.  The indexes 
reflect industry- or economy-wide costs, not the costs of the specific shipbuilder. 
How the Navy uses Labor- and Material-cost Indexes 
In this section of the paper, we present illustrative examples of how the Navy uses labor- 
and material-cost indexes.  We start with a highly oversimplified example of a fixed-price 
contract to illustrate the basic intuition.  Subsequently, we turn to an enhanced (though still less 
complex than reality) example of a contract more in accord with current Navy practices.  This 
latter example is a Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee (FPIF) contract.  An FPIF contract is no longer a 
“pure” fixed-price contract in that it requires the Navy and the shipbuilder to share cost changes 
from the negotiated level with incentives and disincentives for underruns and overruns (whereas 
a textbook fixed-price contract would not).  The shipbuilder’s actual costs are considered in an 
FPIF contract; they are not in a fixed-price contract. 
A Very Simple Example.  Let us suppose the Navy signs a fixed-price contract for a 
$220 million ship on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 2010.  If $100 
million of the payment is to cover expected labor costs, another $100 million is to cover 
expected material costs, and the final $20 million is intended to be contractor profit.  Of course, 
the actual cost the shipbuilder incurs determines the shipbuilder’s profit.  Figure 1 shows the 
shipbuilder’s profit as a function of the actual labor and material cost of the ship.  Increasing 
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Figure 1. Shipbuilder Profit as a Function of Labor and  
Material Cost with a Fixed-price Contract 
Adding material-cost indexes to this fixed-price contract would protect the shipbuilder 
against exogenous cost risk. 
Let us also suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the external labor-cost index 
designated in the contract goes up 5%, while the designated material-cost index goes up 20%.  
Then the Navy’s actual payment to its shipbuilder would be $245 million ($105 million for labor, 
$120 million for materials, $20 million in intended or target profits—assuming the profit level 
does not increase with the indexes).  The shipbuilder’s actual profit would then go up and down 
based on whether their actual cost growth was above or below the indexes’.  Obviously, it is of 
central importance that the cost indexes are agreed upon up front. 
If, on the other hand, the labor-cost index had risen 5% while the material-cost index had 
fallen 10%, the Navy’s payment to the shipbuilder would be $215 million ($105 million in labor, 
$90 million in materials, $20 million for target profit).  Again, actual profit would depend on 
whether the shipbuilder’s total costs had fallen less than or more than the indexes suggested. 
Both this example and the one that follows are over-simplified.  Both examples assume 
all labor is incurred and material purchased on the last day of the contract.  If one alternatively 
assumes the postulated inflation, labor hours, and material purchases occur uniformly between 
2007 and 2010, the average inflation rate would be half as large.  In reality, material purchases 
peak before labor hours are incurred, so there are two cost timing distributions to account for.  
Actual Navy escalation clauses calculate these effects on actual costs incurred monthly.  The 
Appendix discusses such an enhancement. 
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A More Realistic Example.  The Navy does not generally write shipbuilding contracts 
that are as simple as the preceding example.  Instead, the norm is to use FPIF contracts with 
“compensation adjustment clauses” or “escalation provisions” to: 
 Ensure the incentive provision operates independent of outside economic forces that 
impact shipbuilder costs. 
 Keep the shipbuilder from including contingent amounts in its price to cover economic 
uncertainty associated with external cost pressure. 
In this approach, subsequent changes in specified cost indexes result in payments (or 
refunds) tied to the shipbuilder’s actual labor and material costs incurred.  Notice this approach 
is no longer a “pure” fixed-price contract; shipbuilders’ actual costs are considered.  FPIF 
contracts actually operate as cost-type incentive contracts within a certain range of costs. 
We can consider a similar example as above with the Navy signing a contract for a ship 
on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 2010.  It is anticipated $100 
million will be spent on labor and another $100 million on material.  Let us suppose the Navy 
also agrees to a 10% target profit rate and a sharing ratio of 50/50 for increases or decreases in 
cost.  Figure 2 illustrates shipbuilder profit under this FPIF contract versus the preceding fixed-
price case (prior to consideration of cost-index issues).  Since this FPIF contract has cost-
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Figure 2. Shipbuilder Profit as a Function of Labor And Material Cost  
with Different Contract Structures 
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Let us suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the labor-cost index designated in the 
contract goes up 5%, while the designated material-cost index is up 20%.  We assume base 
period labor and material costs of $100 million each.  If the shipbuilder’s actual labor cost was 
$105 million, the Navy would pay a compensation adjustment of $5 million ((0.05 divided by 
1.05) multiplied by $105 million).1  If actual material costs turned out to be $115 million, the 
Navy would make a material compensation adjustment of $19.17 million ((0.20 divided by 1.20) 
multiplied by $115 million).  The “de-escalated base cost” of the ship would be $195.83 million 
(the actual $105 million plus $115 million less the compensation adjustments of $5 million and 
$19.17 million).  The $4.17 million decrease between the initial base cost and the de-escalated 
base cost would translate into a $2.08 million increase in profit for the shipbuilder given the 
assumed 50/50 cost change-sharing ratio.  The shipbuilder is rewarded because actual material 
costs did not rise as rapidly (+15%) as the material-cost index (+20%). 
The Navy’s actual payment to the shipbuilder would be comprised of $195.83 million in 
de-escalated base cost, $5 million in labor escalation payments, $19.17 million in material 
escalation payments, $20 million in target profit, plus $2.08 million in incentive profit—totaling 
$242.08 million.  Shipbuilder profit would be $22.08 million. 
By contrast, holding the shipbuilder’s incurred costs the same as above, suppose the 
labor-cost index had again risen 5% while the material-cost index fell 10%.  The labor 
compensation adjustment would remain $5 million ((0.05 divided by 1.05) multiplied by $105 
million).  The material compensation adjustment would now be a reimbursement from the 
shipbuilder of $12.78 million ((-0.10 divided by 0.90) multiplied by $115 million).  The “de-
escalated base cost” of the ship would be $227.78 million ($105 million plus $115 million minus 
$5 million plus $12.78 million).  This increase in the de-escalated base cost would result in a 
$13.89 million profit penalty for the shipbuilder (50% of the difference between $227.78 million 
and $200 million).  Then, the Navy would pay the shipbuilder $226.11 million ($227.78 million in 
de-escalated base cost plus $5 million in labor escalation payments less a $12.78 million 
material de-escalation reimbursement plus $20 million in target profit less a $13.89 million 
incentive profit penalty).  The shipbuilder profit would be $6.11 million. 
As in the “Very Simple Example,” we have ignored realistic timing issues, e.g., the fact 
that median material cost probably precedes the median labor cost and that neither cost is 
incurred, on average, in 2010.  The Appendix discusses the effects of incorporating labor and 
material-cost time-phasing. 
Figure 3 summarizes the differential results of these examples, holding fixed that the 
labor-cost index increased 5%, while realized shipbuilder costs were $115 million for material 
and $105 million for labor.  Not surprisingly, when the shipbuilder spends more on material than 
included in the original price while the overall material market has falling prices, the cost 
disincentive built into the contract reduces the Navy’s payment and, hence, the shipbuilder’s 
profit.  (The shipbuilder would have performed very poorly if it paid $115 million for material 
while material prices were, on average, falling.) 
                                                
1 For expositional simplicity, we are assuming actual labor costs match the increase in the labor-cost 
index, allowing us to concentrate on material-cost issues. 
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Figure 3. Shipbuilder Profits Are Greater When the Material-cost Index Rises More, 
Realized Costs Held Constant 
The Fixed-price Contract line and the FPIF Contract curve cross at a 15% increase in 
the material-cost index.  We have assumed the shipbuilder’s actual material-cost increase was 
15% or $15 million.  If the shipbuilder can keep its actual material-cost growth below the index 
level, its reward is greater in the fixed-price case, in which there is no cost-change sharing with 
the Navy.  Conversely, the shipbuilder’s profit does not diminish as rapidly if its actual material 
costs increase more than the Material-cost Index with the FPIF contract’s cost sharing. 
If the shipbuilder’s skillful management kept ship costs from rising as much as similar 
costs in the general economy, greater profits are an appropriate reward.  However, if greater 
profits result from escalation payments calculated by an external price index that does not 
accurately reflect what the shipbuilder purchases, then greater profit is not warranted.  
Conversely, it would be unfair to penalize a shipbuilder if an inappropriate cost index declines or 
increases less than the shipbuilder’s actual cost environment.   
The Steel Vessel Index 
A longtime material-cost index in Navy shipbuilding is the “Steel Vessel Index.”  Based 
on an estimate by the Maritime Administration of the mix of materials in a typical commercial 
cargo ship constructed in the 1950s (GAO, 1972), it is a weighted average of three Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) producer price indexes (45% Iron & Steel, 40% General Purpose 
Machinery and Equipment, and 15% Electrical Machinery and Equipment).  If, for instance, the 
Iron & Steel price index increased 3% in a year, the General Purpose Machinery index 
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increased 2%, and the Electrical Machinery index fell 1%, the Steel Vessel Index would 
increase 2% (0.45*0.03+0.4*0.02-0.15*0.01).2 
One criticism of the Steel Vessel cost index is that it does not accurately cover the 
materials used in building a modern ship.3  No modern US Navy ship, for instance, has 45% of 
its material costs in Iron & Steel.  To combat this shortcoming, the DDG-514 and T-AKE5 
programs created their own material-cost indexes, using different weights on the same three 
underlying BLS indexes (DDG-51: 20% Iron & Steel, 43% General Purpose Machinery, 37% 
Electrical Machinery; T-AKE: 10% Iron & Steel, 60% General Purpose Machinery, 30% 
Electrical Machinery).  See Pfeiffer (2006).  In the preceding paragraph’s example, whereas the 
Steel Vessel Index would increase 2%, the DDG-51 index would increase 1.09% 
(0.2*0.03+0.43*0.02-0.37*0.01), and the T-AKE index would increase 1.2% (0.1*0.03+0.6*0.02-
0.3*0.01). 
There is an additional challenge with any of these indexes: even if one correctly 
identified the mix of materials that went into the ship, the materials would be purchased at 
different stages of ship construction.  Steel, for instance, is required early in the construction 
process.  Conversely, combat systems and electrical equipment (perhaps more akin to General 
Purpose or Electrical Machinery) are not delivered to the shipyard and, consequently, do not 
become incurred costs until much later in construction.  Time-phasing the mix of an overall 
material-cost index could provide greater fidelity.  However, it is unlikely any material-cost index 
will completely dissipate a shipbuilder’s exogenous material-cost risk. 
Historically, BLS’s Iron & Steel price index has been much more volatile than the 
General Purpose Machinery or Electrical Machinery indexes.  Figure 4 displays these indexes’ 
quarterly returns (with a positive “return” if the cost index value went up, negative if it fell) 
between the second quarter of 19476 and the fourth quarter of 2006.  We also display the 
quarterly change in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
price deflator, a measure of overall inflation in the economy. 
                                                
2There does not appear to be an Air Force analog to the Steel Vessel Index.  Air Force procurement 
contracts may include BLS-based labor- or material-cost indexing, but this is done on a case-by-case 
basis at the discretion of the program office.  There is no standard aircraft material-cost index.  An 
aircraft’s construction duration is typically much briefer than that of a ship, so inflation issues are less 
prominent. 
3Indeed, criticism of the Steel Vessel Index pre-dates what we might term “modern” ships.  Geismar 
(1975) suggests the Steel Vessel Index was ill-suited to the DD963, Spruance Class destroyer, and the 
LHA, Marine amphibious assault ship—two 1970s-era ship programs.  (Both of these ships were very late 
in delivering, implying inflation issues proved to be more important than would have been the case had 
their production been more timely.) 
4The DDG-51, the USS Arleigh Burke, is a destroyer commissioned on July 4, 1991.  The moniker “DDG-
51” refers to the class of destroyers of which the USS Arleigh Burke was the first (US Navy, 2006). 
5“T-AKE” refers to the Lewis and Clark class of dry cargo/ammunition ships.  The USNS Lewis and Clark, 
the USNS Sacagawea, and the USNS Alan Shepard have been delivered to the Navy; the USNS Richard 
Byrd is under construction (US Navy, 2007; Bigelow, 2007). 
6Monthly BLS data on these cost indexes are available back to January 1947.  However, the BEA GDP 
deflator data are only available quarterly, so we aggregated the BLS data to the quarter level. 
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Figure 4. Quarterly Changes in Different Cost Indexes 
(US DoL, BLS, n.d.; US DoC, BEA, n.d.) 
Naturally, given the Steel Vessel Index’s greater relative weighting of the Iron & Steel 
price index, it has been more volatile than the DDG-51 or T-AKE indexes.  In Figure 5, we plot 
the standard deviation in the quarterly return and the mean quarterly return for the three ship 
material-cost indexes and the GDP deflator between the second quarter of 1947 and the fourth 
quarter of 2006.7  The Steel Vessel Index has the greatest standard deviation in its quarterly 
return. 
                                                
7None of the three ship material-cost indexes existed in 1947.  But, we can use BLS data to 
retrospectively compute how they would have evolved. 
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Figure 5. Quarterly Standard Deviation and Average Return  
of Different Material-cost Indexes 
What Figure 5 does not show is how closely correlated any of these indexes is with the 
actual cost variability a shipbuilder experiences.  The best cost index is the one that minimizes a 
shipbuilder’s exogenous risk and, therefore, minimizes the risk premium the Navy must pay the 
shipbuilder.  We know, however, the Steel Vessel Index over-represents iron and steel costs in 
current naval warship contracts. 
The fact the Steel Vessel Index has had a mean quarterly return greater than the other 
indexes and greater than the economy-wide inflation rate is not prima facie bad news for the 
Navy.  In a competitive setting, a shipbuilder will submit a lower bid up front if it expects super-
normal escalation.  Therefore, the Navy’s expected costs are not, in equilibrium, affected by the 
Index’s mean. 
What is more problematic is the known mismatch between the Steel Vessel Index’s 
composition and a shipbuilder’s material-cost structure.  The shipbuilder bears a risk, for 
instance, that the prices of iron and steel may tumble while the shipbuilder’s do not.  A risk-
averse shipbuilder will require a premium to bear this mismatch-driven risk. 
This mismatch-driven risk could be reduced if the shipbuilder could take a short position 
on steel futures, i.e., hedge against the risk steel prices will fall.  Currently, however, there is no 
functioning steel futures market.8  
                                                
8There is an ongoing debate as to the feasibility and desirability of a steel futures market. See, for 
instance, Anderson (2006). 
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Paradoxically, if the shipbuilder locked in its steel input prices through a long-term, fixed-
price contract with a steel mill, the shipbuilder’s mismatch-driven risk could be exacerbated, not 
mitigated.  If future steel prices fell, the shipbuilder would receive no advantage on the cost side 
while receiving reduced revenue from the Navy. 
We do not know the “right” material-cost index to use to minimize a shipbuilder’s 
material-cost risk.  We do know, however, the Steel Vessel Index is imperfect due to its over-
representation of iron and steel.  As shown in Figure 5, there is little difference between the 
DDG-51 and T-AKE approaches; their quarterly returns are positively correlated at the 0.985 
level.  (By contrast, the Steel Vessel index has a 0.936 correlation with the DDG-51 index and 
0.873 with T-AKE.) 
Of the three Navy material-cost indexes, T-AKE (0.655) and DDG-51 (0.636) are more 
highly correlated with the GDP deflator than is the Steel Vessel Index (0.538).  The explanation 
for the Steel Vessel Index’s relative lack of correlation with overall inflation in the economy is 
that the Iron & Steel cost index has a much lower correlation (0.360) with the GDP deflator than 
the General Purpose Machinery (0.634) and Electrical Machinery (0.609) cost indexes.  So, a 
material-cost index that over-samples Iron & Steel moves away from representation of 
economy-wide costs. 
The foremost argument in favor of the Steel Vessel Index is its familiarity and, 
consequently, the comfort some shipbuilders have with the Index.  Almost everyone we met in 
the nautical construction industry knows of the Steel Vessel Index, and most have experience 
with contracts tied to it.  The Steel Vessel Index is, perhaps, akin to the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average in that one would not invent it anew (or at least not with its current weightings), but its 
fame and tradition keep it in use.9 
If shipbuilders are familiar and comfortable with the Index, the Navy and the government 
benefit, as this may imply shipbuilders can be paid less when the Index is in use.  The best 
material-cost index minimizes the exogenous risk shipbuilders perceive they face so as to 
therefore minimize Navy ship acquisition costs.  Unless one believes familiarity is extremely 
important, however, the manifest cost structure mismatch of the Steel Vessel Index suggests its 
usage does not minimize the Navy’s expected costs.   
Conclusions 
We do not think the Navy should use the Steel Vessel Index to adjust for material-cost 
changes in future shipbuilding contracts.  The Steel Vessel Index clearly puts excessive weight 
on Iron & Steel relative to the materials actually used in constructing a modern ship.  Usage of 
the Steel Vessel Index does not appropriately mitigate contractor material-cost risk.  Indeed, 
                                                
9Discussing an earlier version of this paper, Jim Jondrow of the Center for Naval Analyses raised the 
following analogy to the Navy’s continued use of the Steel Vessel Index: let us suppose one owned a 
portfolio that mirrored the NASDAQ Composite Index, but one observed the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (or vice versa).  On March 10, 2000, the NASDAQ Composite Index closed at an all-time high of 
5046, but then fell precipitously, ultimately hitting a bottom of 1114 on October 9, 2002.  See “Nasdaq 
Composite” (n.d.).  Meanwhile, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 9929 on March 10, 2000, and 
at 7286 on October 9, 2002. See Yahoo! Finance (n.d.).  The indexes were positively correlated with one 
another, but the magnitudes of the changes were sharply different. 
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from a shipbuilder’s perspective, a new risk is created: the risk the prices of what the shipbuilder 
actually buys will rise faster than the price of steel. 
The shortcomings of the Steel Vessel Index have been known for many years.  The 
DDG-51 and T-AKE programs created their own material-cost indexes with lower weight on Iron 
& Steel.  Their material-cost indexes, which empirically have been highly correlated with one 
another, are doubtlessly better indexes than the Steel Vessel Index, though they still appear to 
put too much weight on Iron & Steel (DDG-51: 20%, T-AKE: 10%). 
We urge the Navy to develop a “Modern Vessel Index” that more appropriately 
represents the material used in constructing ships.  Movement toward a better index would also 
be an opportunity to explore a time-phased material-cost index—e.g., reflect the fact 
shipbuilders typically buy keel steel early in production, with on-board electronics procured 
much later in the construction process.  The more accurately a material-cost index captures a 
shipbuilder’s external material-cost risk, the less the Navy may expect to pay its shipbuilders. 
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Appendix 1. Time-phasing Material- and Labor-cost Indexes 
In the examples in the body of this paper, we unrealistically assume all shipbuilder 
expenses are borne at the end of the three-year build cycle; we then use the material and labor-
cost index values at the end of the build cycle to determine the Navy’s payment to the 
shipbuilder. 
In fact, actual Navy shipbuilding contracts are more sophisticated.  Instead of assuming 
all costs are incurred at the end of the build cycle, a month-by-month expenditure pattern is 


































Figure A.1. An Illustration of Assumed Percentages of Total Costs Incurred by Month 
Figure A.1, like most Navy shipbuilding contracts, assumes the shipbuilder generally 
bears material costs (e.g., buying keel steel) in front of labor costs.10 
The effect of this cost time-phasing assumption is to move forward the implicit median 
date of contractor expenditure and, therefore, to reduce (assuming the labor and material-cost 
indexes generally increase) the shipbuilder’s inflation-related adjustment.  This reduction is 
generally more marked for material costs because of the standard assumption material costs 
are borne sooner. 
                                                
10 Standard shipbuilding contracts do not, however, differentiate between types of material.  An 
enhancement we urge the Navy to consider would be to break up material costs, e.g., assume steel 
expenditures for the keel precede electronics-type expenditures for onboard weapon systems. 
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Revisiting a Very Simple Example.  As above, let us suppose the Navy signs a fixed-
price contract for a ship on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 2010.  
We assume the ship has $100 million each in expected labor and material costs plus an 
additional expected or target profit of $20 million.  However, labor and material costs are 
expected to be borne in accord with Figure A.1’s pattern. 
Let us suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the external labor-cost index designated in 
the contract goes up 5% while the designated material-cost index goes up 20%.  In addition, 
(though one need not make this pedagogically simplifying assumption) those increases occur 
uniformly over the 36-month build period.  Then the effective increase in assumed labor costs 
(given Figure A.1’s cost incurrence pattern) is 2.6%, while the increase in material costs is 
8.1%.  Notice the effective increase in labor costs is 52% of the 3-year total increase, while the 
effective increase in material costs is 40% of the 3-year total increase; this differential reflects 
the assumption that material costs generally precede labor costs. 
In the “Very Simple Example’s” contract, the Navy’s actual payment to the shipbuilder 
would be $230.7 million ($102.6 million for labor, $108.1 million for material, $20 million for 
target profit). 
Time-phasing contracts does not axiomatically imply reduced shipbuilder profits (though 
one might draw such an inference from juxtaposing this example to the body of the paper’s 
“Very Simple Example”).  The shipbuilder’s initial bid will be made cognizant of how (and 
whether) labor and material costs are to be indexed.  A less generous (but more accurate) 
indexing approach of this sort will doubtlessly cause the shipbuilder’s bid to be greater. 
Revisiting a More Realistic Example.  In our “More Realistic Example,” the Navy 
provided the shipbuilder with an FPIF contract with a 50/50 sharing ratio on increases or 
decreases in costs. 
As noted above, if the labor-cost index designated in the contract goes up 5% in three 
years, while the designated material-cost index goes up 20%. The effective increases in the 
indexes are 2.6% and 8.1%, respectively, adjusting for Figure A.1’s assumed expenditure 
pattern. 
In “A More Realistic Example,” we had actual labor costs of $105 million.  If we scaled 
this value down in accordance with Figure A.1, the “adjusted” actual labor costs would be 
$102.6 million.  Similarly, “adjusted” actual material costs would be $106.1 million. 
The labor compensation adjustment would now be $2.6 million ((0.026 divided by 1.026) 
multiplied by $102.6 million).  The material cost adjustment would be $8.0 million ((0.081 divided 
by 1.081) multiplied by $106.1 million).  The de-escalated base costs of the ship would be 
$198.1 million (the “adjusted” actual $102.6 million in labor and $106.1 million in material less 
the compensation adjustments of $2.6 million for labor and $8.0 million for material).  The 
shipbuilder profit would be increased by $0.9 million. 
As in the body of the paper, the shipbuilder’s profit is greater, holding its actual incurred 
costs constant, when the material-cost index grows more.  The effect of time-phasing is to 
roughly halve (more of a reduction for material than for labor) the measured indexed inflation 
rate.  But the comparative static result that the shipbuilder is better off when the material-cost 
index rises more, holding costs constant, remains.  Again, such rewards are appropriate if 
shipbuilder management held costs down better than might have been expected.  Conversely, if 
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greater profits were received because an index used to calculate escalation payments is flawed, 
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